By S.P. Seth
Lately, there has been some forward movement in India-China relations. Indeed, they have come a long way since 1998 when New Delhi justified its nuclear tests, citing a security threat from China. India no longer maintains this view. The two countries have just exchanged high-level visits. Zhu Rongji visited India last year as China’s prime minister. In April, George Fernandes, India’s defense minister, paid a week-long visit to China. The Fernandes visit was significant because he is considered’s China visit.
So far, so good, but the India-China relationship is highly complex. There is of course the intractable border dispute that led to the brief 1962 war. Despite many meetings of their Joint Working Group over the years to sort out the border problem, nothing substantive has come of it.
Beijing broadly favors legitimizing the Line of Actual Control it established after the 1962 conflict, with necessary modifications here and there. In other words, it is for a package political deal.
In India, on the other hand, this would be regarded as validating China’s military incursions. Any government in India would find it difficult to sell such a package in the country’s noisy democracy. The border problem, therefore, casts a long shadow on China-India relations.
Tibet is another important issue. Despite India’s recognition of Tibet as Chinese territory, its hosting of the Dalai Lama, his entourage and Tibetan refugees is regarded with considerable suspicion in China. Beijing could solve the problem by making an autonomy deal with the Dalai Lama’s government-in-exile, but it views the Tibetan spiritual leader with great hostility.
There are some tentative signs of an improvement in Sino-Tibetan relations, following recent dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s emissaries and Beijing. Going by past history, however, cautious optimism is in order.
In a larger context, Beijing views with concern the developing politico-strategic nexus between Washington and New Delhi. Their militaries have conducted joint exercises, and there are regular high-level political exchanges. New Delhi also appears comfortable with the planned U.S. National Missile Defense System, regarding it as a mere technological progression.
Beijing has cautioned New Delhi against supporting the NMD. It seems to regard India as part of a U.S. policy of containing China through a network of alliances and partnerships on its borders.
At the same time New Delhi is not happy with China’s virtual alliance with Pakistan, which New Delhi sees as being designed to pin it down in South Asia. Beijing appears keen to keep India involved with its immediate neighbor.
Even though China is contemptuous of India as a potential strategic and political rival, it still devotes considerable time and energy to circumscribe its role. Besides Pakistan, Beijing has also cultivated India’s other neighbors: Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. It is a warning of sorts to New Delhi that Beijing is not without leverage if it were to become part of U.S. containment efforts.
India has to worry about both its northeastern–with China–and western–with Pakistan–borders, thus stretching thin its military resources. Indeed, before the 1962 border war, Beijing had warned New Delhi that it would have to reckon with two military fronts–China and Pakistan–if it refused to back away from the Chinese-claimed border.
Today, the situation is different. With the emergence of the United States as the world’s sole superpower, China’s room to maneuver is limited. The United States regards China as a strategic competitor and will do everything possible to prevent Beijing from challenging its power.
Washington has not put India in the same league. It is strategically important only as a regional counterweight to China. Beijing, while suspicious of India’s role, does not want to push it into the U.S. embrace.
Nor is India keen on becoming a U.S. proxy. China is its most important neighbor and both countries have to live with each other. It is, therefore, imperative that they establish peaceful relations and build upon them. New Delhi hopes to smooth the rough edges of Beijing’s regional South Asia policy, especially with regard to Pakistan.
India and China also share antipathy to Islamic terrorism in Kashmir and Xinjiang. It is believed that Beijing occasionally exercises restraint on Pakistan on the question of cross-border terrorism in Indian Kashmir.
There remains much distrust on both sides. New Delhi feels vulnerable to China’s nuclear threat. Beijing has missiles targeted at major Indian cities from bases in Tibet. Although both India and China swear by the no-first-use nuclear policy as a general principle, Beijing is reluctant to enshrine it in bilateral relationships. India’s vulnerability is further compounded because of China’s role in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile development.
So while New Delhi and Beijing are moving toward improved relations, there are obvious limits as to how close the relationship can become.
