A Brief Analysis of the Tibetan Struggle

Khyunglho Tsetan Dolkar

First I would like to offer my heartiest greetings and Tashi Delek to all our brothers and sisters - those who could participate in the Special Meeting and those who wish to participate but cannot. In this short paper I want to address three issues: factors that led to the recent March uprisings in Tibet, the present situation of Tibetan struggle on the international stage, and the suitability of the Middle Way Policy.

Factors of the March Uprising

Even though I am tempted to say that there is one and only one factor that led to the widespread uprising in Tibet, namely the Tibetan people’s aspiration for independence, it would be rather simplistic on my part to do so. The situation is highly complex and so many factors were in play.

However, I would like to identify three main causes which underlie not only the recent deluge of demonstrations that gripped the whole of Chol-kha-sum, but also every major uprising that has ever taken place in Tibet on significant dates. The first main cause, of course, is the concrete and immutable ‘collective national consciousness’ shared by every Tibetan that the Chinese and the Tibetans are two distinct nations with distinct peoples. Neither harsh policies and intense repressions of the sixties and seventies, nor reforms and changes of the eighties and nineties have succeeded in eroding this national sense of the Tibetan people. This has remained the bedrock of all the Tibetan movements, be it for independence, freedom or equality. The second cause can be attributed to the Chinese government’s repressive, harmful and discriminatory policies, particularly concerning religious freedom, freedom of expression and freedom of faith. Exacerbating this dismal situation is the lack of rule of law, which I want to identify as the third cause, that could guarantee Tibetan people their basic rights. These conditions have fostered and deepened frustrations, resentments and a sense of futility in the hearts of Tibetan people against their occupier, which had frequently erupted as demonstrations, riots and uprisings.

Although the three factors are quite obvious to anyone who is familiar with the Tibetan situation, I would like to comment some more on the second and the third factors. Maugre the Chinese government’s claims that it has provided Regional Ethnic Autonomy to major ethnic minorities, the Tibetans have suffered inimical policies that aimed at undermining their unique ethnic characteristics such as language, religious belief, economy and so on. Instituting and implementation of such policies run totally counter to the Chinese government’s claims that the ethnic minority groups enjoy special Autonomous status for the preservation of their national and cultural identities. Lack of judicial independence, weak judicial authority, judicial corruption ⁽ⁱⁱ⁾ and party chauvinism all ensure that the rule of law is hardly practiced not just in Tibet but throughout China.

In a country that observes the rule of law, citizens can enjoy basic rights and if, because of corrupted government or bad leaders, the citizens were denied their fundamental rights, they still have legal means to fight for their rights. However, if the judiciary system lacks the appropriate authority, as in the case of the PRC, to rectify such problems, then the people will suffer worst kinds of oppression. The history of the world has shown that at such times people resort to radical measures including violent demonstrations. The March-and-subsequent months’ uprising, which spread right across the windswept mountains of languishing Tibet, was yet another instance of people taking to the streets to demand their basic rights.

Situation of Tibetan Struggle and the Suitability of the Middle Way

Study of the history of national struggles will reveal that three major factors – two positive and one negative – were usually responsible for successful resolution of ethnic and national problems. The two positive factors are: concrete and continuous struggle by the nation until its dream is realized, and support from the superpower nations. At present the Tibetan struggle lacks both of them. A continuous and interminable struggle becomes quite impossible for the Tibetans living inside Tibet because of the absolute suppression by the Chinese government and the widespread PLA presence that constantly monitors people’s movement. As for the Tibetan expatriates, their persistent efforts at organizing demonstrations are often enervated by small number of participants and restrained by regulations of the host nations. Thus, the history of Tibetan struggle has been spells of bursting activities followed by long spells of silence. The second factor is also absent from the Tibetan struggle as no superpower nation has been willing to bear the brunt of Beijing’s fury and support Tibet on political grounds. Besides, the present reality is that all the superpowers unanimously agree that Tibet is an integral part of the People’s Republic of China.

In the cutthroat world of politics, the key question revolves not around the principles of morality and truth but rather around selfish gains and self-interest; the superpowers are neither driven by principles of truth nor swayed by appeal to its sense of fairness. The negative factor is the weakening of the occupying nation’s power, either due to external conflicts or internal strife, to the point where it cannot rule the minority nationalities. In such a situation the minority nationality could find opportunities to wrestle its freedom from the occupying force. Unfortunately, that is not the case with China. What happens in a situation where not only are the three factors missing but the adversary happens to be extremely powerful is that the minority nationality is compelled to make compromises and accept preconditions in order to achieve their maximum demands. This becomes apparent when we look at various nationalities who have achieved different degrees of autonomy or self-governance. Thus, in the circumstances where all the three factors are lacking, the suitable course Tibetans can take in resolving their problems is to have direct negotiations with the Chinese government and seek an amicable solution. That, I think, is what the Middle Way Policy has been trying to achieve.

Opinions exist in our community that the Middle Way Policy has failed to produce any concrete results, in the thirty something years since its inception, and therefore must be abandoned ⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾ in favor of something else. Even though the Middle Way Policy has yet to achieve its ultimate goal, it is not entirely without results. Since 2002, in a span of six years, eight rounds of talks have been held between the representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. Through these talks the two sides have succeeded in fathoming each other’s demands, aspirations and thoughts, which could be considered as important steps leading up to negotiation. We should realize that holding eight rounds of talks in six years indicate the existence of some pressure, regardless of its degree, on the Chinese government from the international community. Moreover, nations are getting more involved and paying closer attention to the Tibetan issues and this we could consider as an achievement of some sort, since the intervention of international community is a basic necessity in conflict resolutions.

Recently, Zhu Weiqun, the vice-minister of the Communist Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD), refuted the Middle Way Policy and attacked every major features of it, calling that these cannot be fulfilled. Many Tibetans responded to the attacks by stating that the Middle Way Policy has failed and therefore has to be abandoned. Before responding to these allegations I want to briefly lay down the charges for you. First, the Middle Way Policy still maintains that Tibet was not an integral part of China “since ancient times”; hence it disguised independence as a final goal. Second, the Middle Way Policy aspires to achieve “Greater Tibet” which has never existed historically. Third, its aspiration for higher degree of autonomy aims to revive the feudal serfdom. Fourth, its demand for withdrawal of Chinese military from Greater Tibet will compromise the region’s social stability and China’s national security. And the fifth, the Middle Way’s call for cessation of migration of other ethnic groups to Tibet and the withdrawal of Han migrants from Tibet.

I want to remind that the important features of the Middle Way Policy are not newly established and these attacks are also not new and fresh. For instance, in the Five Point Peace Plan of 1987 His Holiness the Dalai Lama has clearly stated that Tibet was historically not a part of China but rather was “a fully independent state when the People's Liberation Army invaded the country in 1949/50.” The UFWD’s Yang Ming Fu responded by issuing warning that if the Dalai Lama continued pursuing independence the Chinese government would implement harsher policies in Tibet. Likewise, the demand for Greater Tibet was not a novel phenomenon. It was conveyed to the Chinese authorities as early as the beginning of eighties when the special delegations visited Tibet. Jiang Ping of UFWD is said to have warned that there won’t be any opportunity for negotiations unless the demand for Greater Tibet is relinquished. The remaining features have been laid down clearly in the Strasbourg Proposal, which the Chinese said could never form the basis of negotiations. Therefore, the Tibetans should neither be shocked and consternated, nor be confused and disheartened at China’s virulent attack of the Middle Way Policy. Some people feel that since China will never be sincere and honest in resolving the Tibet issue, no efforts should be wasted pursuing peaceful talks. Isn’t it a fact that in the histories of national struggles no nationality has ever won their struggle hoping that the occupier would display honesty? So despite the Chinese insincerity, our struggle must go on. That should be the essence of our struggle.

I want to recommend few points to refute the above Chinese attacks. So long as Tibet’s historical status remained controversial, China will find in it an excuse to delay the process of negotiation. One way to handle this issue is to present an unbiased historical study of the status of Tibet, to international community in general and the Chinese people in particular, by compiling treaties, agreements and other documents that Tibetan government had signed with other nations such as Mongolia, Nepal and Great Britain. For instance, the recently discovered text of the Tibet-Mongol Treaty of 1913 testifies to Tibet’s independent status and her right to enter into treaties with other nations as recent as 1913. Likewise, we could use the recent parliamentary statement issued, on 29 October 2008, by the UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband stating that Tibet had never been fully part of China even when China was enjoying a “special position” at the beginning of the 20th century. Such documents could show the true status of Tibet before the Chinese invasion and fend off China’s single-minded demand of validation from His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Changing Tibet’s historical status necessitates the changing of other nations’ history and their treaties with Tibet. Such right is not in the hands of either the Chinese or the Tibetans.

The issue of Greater Tibet as a historical fact cannot be disproved by the Chinese government. Moreover, one of the main purposes for demanding Greater Tibet is to facilitate the complete preservation of culture and national identity of the Tibetan people. The Chinese constitution asserts that Autonomous Regions will be formed wherever minority nationalities reside in compact forms and the Autonomous status provided in that locality. Since all the three provinces of Tibet lie adjacent to each other and each share common national identity, it makes perfect sense to group them together into one unit. This should be made known to the Chinese people. The allegation that the Tibetan government will reestablish feudal-serfdom once a high degree of autonomous status has been achieved is totally baseless. Democracy has taken firm root in the Tibetan exile community and over the course of forty nine years the process of democratization has gained more and more momentum. Thus, there is not even a slight chance for feudal system’s resurrection. Lastly, the allegation that the Middle Way Policy calls for the withdrawal of the non-Tibetan nationalities from Tibet is baseless as no such clause exist in the policy.

Finally, I would like to point out two things that we must be circumspect of when resolving the Tibetan issue.

1. In the process of negotiation we must never accept any conditions that could have negative consequences to the preservation of our national and cultural identity.

2. The Tibetan government should ensure that the final decision making power is in the hands of the six million Tibetans as stated in the Middle Way Policy.
If necessary steps are not taken to guarantee these two elements, then real dangers of losing the national and cultural identity of the Tibetan people could arise and also risks of fostering dissensions amongst the Tibetan people of the three provinces may arise. Moreover, since establishing a democratic form of government in Tibet has been one of the highest aspirations of the Middle Way Policy, allowing the Tibetan people to choose their final destiny has the added advantage of promoting open competition, facilitating participation of maximum numbers of people in the process of political decision-making, and ensuring basic civil liberties. These characteristics constitute the three dimensions of the “root concept” of democracy,^(iv) and following this path could ensure the fulfillment of our aspiration to have democratic government, formation of a stable community and a government that is by the people and for the people.

Khyunglho Tsetan Dolkar got her PhD. Degree in the field of political science from Philipps University in Marburg, Germany. Her dissertation was on the Sino-Tibetan relations and the internationalization of the Tibetan issue. She is currently living in Atlanta, Georgia, and is continuing her research in this field. She can be contacted at khyunglho@yahoo.com

footnote

ii. Dr. Minxin Pei, ‘Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, read at a hearing titled, ‘The Emergence of China Throughout Asia: Security and Economic Consequences for the U.S.’, 7 June 2005. Accessible here.

iii. All of us must pause and ponder very carefully before making any judgments, especially by listening to a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party. Consider these facts: 1) The refutations by Zhu Weiqun came after the Special Envoys announced that they are forbidden by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile to divulge the content of the talks until after the Special Meeting, 2) The always tight-lipped Party officials became loquacious about the talks at this specific time. I think the recent attack on the Middle Way Policy is a very clever ruse by the Chinese government to derail the Middle Way Approach. Why else would the Chinese government openly claim that the Middle Way Approach has failed to make progress and criticize it, when in the past the CPC government has maintained a very tight lip regarding the talks? Here are few possible reasons for the Chinese government to issue those statements: 1. Create disunity in the exile community concerning the Middle Way Policy, 2. Discredit His Holiness the Dalai Lama by discrediting his policy, 3. Create disorientation in the Tibetan struggle.

iv. Dirk Berg-Schlosser, ‘Concept, Measurements and Sub-Types in Democratization Research’, Dirk Berg-Schlosser (ed.), Democratisation: The State of the Art, Wiesbaden, Germany, 2004, p. 52.